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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE DAVID CASE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14256 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the 
defendant, Lonnie David Case, was charged with the 
crime of aggravated robbery by an information filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on May 15, 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried by jury before the 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, District Judge on August 22, 
1975, and found guilty of aggravated robbery. On the 
same day, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that his conviction should be 
reversed or in the alternative, a new trial granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 14, 1975, a complaint was issued by 
Judge Paul Grant in the City Court of Salt Lake City, 
charging Lonnie David Case with the crime of aggravated 
robbery in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-302 (1953) 
(R. 5) The complaint alleged that the defendant-appellant 
using a deadly weapon, a knife, robbed Myrna Barker cind 
took $129.00 cash from the cash register on the 10th day 
of April, 1975. On May 15, 1975 the appellant was charged 
in District Court of the Third Judicial District by an 
information alleging this offense. (R.6) 
Prior to trial, the attorney for the defendant, 
Jack Kunkler, filed a notice of intention to claim alibi 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17 (Supp. 1953). (R.8) 
The defendant claimed that at the time of the alleged offense 
he was at the Granada Apartments on 47th South and Redwood 
Road in the presence of Craig Christensen, Brent Christensen, 
Neil Mahlum and Glenna Mahlum. 
The appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable 
Gordon R. Hall, Third Judicial District Judge on August 
22, 1975, and was found guilty by the jury of aggravated 
robbery as charged in the Information. (R.15) The appellant Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was sentenced on the same day to an indeterminate term 
of 5 to life at the Utah State Prison, the sentence to 
run concurrently with the sentence he was then serving. 
(R.36) 
At the trial, the State's first witness was Myrna 
Barker, who was employed at the 7-11 Grovery Store located 
at 4690 South and Redwood Road in Salt Lake County. (R.48) 
Mrs. Barker testified that while working alone on the 
3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift an individual whom she identified 
at the trial as the defendant entered the store just after 
10:00 P.M. on April 10th. (R. 49) She testified that while 
at the counter, the individual had come up behind her, put a 
knife against her back and said, "Empty the tills." (R.50) 
After she opened the till, the defendant, according to the 
testimony of the witness, took all of the currency, about 
$120.00, and placed it in his pocket. (R. 51) She described 
the knife used in the robbery as a pocket knife. Mrs. Barker 
testified that the individual she identified as the appellant 
after taking a carton of cigarettes left the store by foot and 
walked south on Redwood Road. (R. 52) On cross-examination, 
the witness testified that the time of the offense had to be 
between 10:00 P.M. and 10:30 P.M. and that at the time she didn't 
smell alcohol on his breath. (R. 54) 
Officer Bruce Clements, a deputy sheriff with Salt Lake 
County, was qualified as an expert and testified that he attempted 
-3-
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to take fingerprints at the store after the offense, but 
was unable to discover any latent prints. (R. 63) These two 
witnesses comprised the extent of the States examination in 
chief. 
The defendant's counsel called as a witness Mrs. 
Glenna Mahlum who testified she had known the defendant 
for eight years. (R. 69) She testified that on April 10, 
of 1975, the day of the offense, the defendant was at her 
home along with several other people and they were celebrating 
her birthday. According to Mrs. Mahlum the defendant was in 
her presence for the entire evening until after 11:00 P.M. Her 
husband, Neil Mahluti gave a similar account of that evening. 
(R. 81) He indicated that he knew the defendant did not 
leave until after 11:00 P.M. because of the program they were 
all watching on television. The next witness presented by the 
defense, Brent Christensen, corroborated the testimony 
given by the Mahlums. (R.93) 
Officer Labrum was recalled by the defendant. (R.101) 
He said that he had interviewed the Mahlumsafter the robbery 
and they told him that the appellant had left their home at about 
11:15 P.M. on the evening in question. (R.104) On cross-
examination he testified that Mrs. Mahlun had told him that 
the appellant and the Christensen brothers had arrived at 
about 5:00 P.M. (R. Ill) 
The state stipulated that the appellant was arrested 
-4-
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at 2:40 A.M. on April 11th for public intoxication. (R. 84) 
The State's first rebuttal witness was Craig 
Christensen who was present under subpoena by the defendant. 
(R. 133) On examination by the State, he reaffirmed the 
story given by his brother and the Mahlums. He also testified 
that he had hever had any conversations with Mrs. Barker 
at the 7-11 store converning the robbery following the 
incident. The prosecutor also asked him where the appellant 
Mr. Case was living on April 22. (R. 140) The witness 
asnwered "with his parents while he was out of the point." 
The State then recalled Neal and Glenna Mahlum to the stand 
and they reaffirmed their testimony on direct. (R. 141, 142) 
The fourth and final wintess called by the State was 
Mrs. Barker, who had testified in the case in chief. (R. 143) 
She stated that after the incident Craig Christensen had come 
into the store and said that he knew the person that robbed 
the store. (R. 145) She further testified that Craig Christensen 
had said "that he had been with Mr. Case the night of the 
robbery and that he had tried to get him to go with him and 
he hadn't went." (R. 148) 
On surrebuttal, the defense called Craig Christensen 
to the stand and he denied ever making the alleged statements 
to which Mrs. Barker had testified. (R. 154) He stated that he 
did not know who had robbed the store. 
-5-
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I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE IN REBUTTAL 
OF THE APPELLANT'S ALIBI DEFENSE BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-22-17(Supp. 
1953) AND THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT 
TO RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
The Attorney for the Defendant, Jack Kunkler, filed 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17 (Supp. 1953) a notice 
of intention to claim an alibi defense on June 3, 1975. 
(R. 8). The defendant listed in this notice all of the 
witnesses to be called by the defense to establish the alibi, 
as well as specifying the place at which the defendant claimed 
to have been at the time the offense was committed. 
The prosecution did not file within five days as 
required by 77-22-17 (1) the names or addresses of witnesses 
to be offered in rebuttal. Before the trial began, the prosecutor 
in chambers, revealed his intention to call four rebuttal 
witnesses. (%15%)• In response to this disclosure, the 
appellant moved to exclude all evidence offered by the State in 
rebuttal on the authority of 77-22-17(3). (£($#). The trial 
court denied the motion and the State introduced the rebuttal 
evidence. (R. 133-153). The appellant moved for a mistrial 
at the close of evidence on the failure of the State to comply 
with the Statute. (R. 157). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17, which was enacted by 
the laws of 1975, Chapter 34, Section 1 and effective at 
the time of appellant's trial provides: 
(1) . . . Not less than five days after 
receipt of defendant's witness list, 
or such other times as the court may 
direct, the prosecuting attorney shall 
file and serve upon the defendant the 
names and addresses of the witnesses 
the state proposes to offer in rebuttal 
to discredit the defendant's alibi at 
the trial of the cause. 
(2) Both the defendant and the prosecuting 
attorney shall be under a continuing 
duty to promptly disclose the names 
and addresses of additional witnesses 
which come to the attention of either 
party subsequent to filing their res-
pective witness lists as provided in 
this section. 
(3) If a defendant fails to file and serve 
a copy of the notice as required in 
subsection (1), the Court may exclude 
evidence offered by the defendant for 
the purpose of proving an alibi, except 
the testimony of the defendant himself. 
If the prosecuting attorney fails to file 
and serve a copy on the defendant of a list 
of witnesses as provided in subsection (1), 
the court may exclude evidence offered by 
the state in rebuttal to the defendant's 
alibi evidence. 
(4) For good cause shown the court may waive the 
requirements of this section. 
The current statute replaced the previous notice of alibi 
statute, Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17, L. 1935, Ch. 120, 
Seciton 1, which unlike the present statute did not require 
the prosecution to disclose their witnesses while requiring the 
defendant to give notice of his defense. 
-7-
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The current statute does not contain the constitut-
ional infirmities which were present in the former statute 
as a result of its lack of reciprocal discovery by the 
defendant. The United States Supreme Court held in 
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1972) that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the enforcement 
of an alibi statute unless a reciprocal right to discover 
the State's case if given to criminal defendants. The 
Court found that in the absence of such an opportunity to 
discover the State's rebuttal witnesses, a criminal defendant 
cannot be compelled to reveal his alibi defense. The Court 
reasoned that it is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant 
to divulge the details of his own case while at the same 
time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning 
refutation of the very evidence he discloses to the State. 
In the light of the rule announced in Wardius v. 
Oregon, the prosecution is compelled to disclose to the 
defendant a list of the names and addresses of the witnesses 
used to rebut the alibi defense on constitutional grounds, 
as well as on any statutory grounds. A failure by the State 
to reciprocate and properly disclose its witnesses violates 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the 
defendant has been required to furnish alibi information to 
the State. As Justice Marshall said in the opinion in Wardius: 
-8-
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The State may not insist that trials be run 
or a "search for truth" so far as defense 
witnesses are concerned while maintaining 
"poker game" secrecy for its own witnesses, 
at 470 U. S. 475. 
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, Pa. ____ 
319 A. 2d 161 (1974), the defendant, pursuant to 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure had 
notified the Commonwealth of the names and addresses 
of the witnesses he intended to call to establish an 
alibi. The defendant's request for the names and addresses 
of those witnesses the Commonwealth planned to produce to 
refute his alibi was refused by the trial court. The 
Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth was constititionally 
bound to afford the defendant reciprocal discovery as required 
by Wardius v. Oregon Supra. The Court said: 
Due process requires that if an accused 
is compelled to comply with a notice of 
alibi rule, the the Commonwealth must 
reciprocate and provide the names and 
addresses of all witnesses who will be 
called to refute an accused's alibi 
regardless of whether the witnesses will 
be called in rebuttal or in the Commonwealth 
case in chief. Note 4 at 163.(Emphasis 
added.) 
The conviction of the defendant in Jackson was reversed 
and a new trial was granted because the Commonwealth had not 
shown that the constitutional error involved was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that if the 
defendant had been afforded reciprocal discovery, he would 
have had the opportunity to be better prepared to cross-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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examine and to impeach the government witnesses. 
In light of the foregoing authority the trial 
court's failure to exclude the State1s rebuttal evidence 
constituted reversable error on either of two grounds: 
(1) the trial court abused its discretion under 77-12-17 in 
refusing to exclude the State's rebuttal evidence, and (2) 
toe denial of reciprocal discovery violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As to the first ground, Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17 
specifically states that the prosecution within 5 days shall 
"file and serve upon the defendant the names and addresses of 
the witnesses the State proposes to offer in rebuttal to 
discredit the defendant's alibi. . ." The clear language 
of the statute requires the prosecution to notify the defendant 
of the witnesses to be called on rebuttal even though these 
same witnesses may also be subpoened for the prosecution's 
case in chief. 
In the present case, the prosecutor, Mr. Anderson, 
indicated that he believed he had not violated the statute 
because his witnesses were available to the defense to 
question. (R. 161) Mr. Craig Christensen was subpoened 
by the defense though never called and was present at 
trial. Mrs. Barker was called by the prosecution on direct 
and the prosecutor stated that defense counsel could have 
examined her at any time. 
However, the statute requires more discovery than was 
allowed the appellant by the prosecution. In State v. Anderson, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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25 Utah 2d 26, 474 P. 2d 735 (1970) this Court held under 
the former alibi statute that: 
Section 77-12-17, U. C. A. 1953, not only 
specified the time within which the notice 
must be filed but the requisite information 
which must be included therein. A failure 
to comply forecloses the defendant from 
introducing evidence tending to establish an 
alibi. However, the statute does grant the 
trial court discretion where good cause is 
shown why the defense failed to file the 
required notice. at 736. 
In Anderson, the Court was dealing with a failure by the defendant 
not the prosecition as in this case to supply proper notice 
of alibi. Similar exclusionary principles should apply with 
equal force to the prosecution when a proper notice is not 
filed. Subsection (4) of 77-12-17 as amended requires the 
prosecution to show good cause before the requirements can be 
waived. The prosecution in the present case did not come forward 
with any evidence prior to the deadline for filing the list of 
rebuttal witnesses to warrant a waiver. The records does not 
disclose that the prosecution had established "good cause" 
for the failure to file the required information. The fact that 
the witnesses were called on direct examination as available 
to be interviewed by the appellant's counsel at trial is not 
sufficient cause for noncompliance with the requirements of the 
statute,prior to the deadline for filing, to warrant a 
waiver of the requirements. The fact that the rebuttal 
witnesses were also called on direct examination and 
available during the trial to be interviewed is not 
sufficient cause for non-compliance with the requirements Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Secondly/ by not enforcing reciprocal discovery 
the trial court violated the defendant's right under Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to discover 
the prosecution's witnesses. Wardius v. Oregon, supra 
and Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra. Thus, even if this 
Court does not find that the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to exclude the evidence, the conviction of the 
appellant should be reversed on these constitutional grounds. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE HAD 
BEEN ADMITTED THAT THE APPELLANT HAD BEEN INCARCERATED IN 
THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
During the re-direct examination of witness Craig 
Christensen,the prosecutor, John Anderson, asked the witness 
if he knew whre Mr. Case was living at the time. The witness 
answered "With his parents while we was out at the point but 
he was living with his parents." (R. 140) Just prior to 
this testimony, the appellant's counsel on cross-examination had 
asked Craig Christensen if there was any particular reason 
that he recalled it was April 10. Unexpectedly the witness 
answered, "No, just that it was the day that he had come out 
of prison." (R. 138) The attorney for the appellant made a 
motion for a mistrial based on these prejudicial disclosures. 
(R. 138) In this motion, the appellant claimed that it was 
common knowledge that the reference of the witness to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"point" was understood by the jury as a reference to the 
Utah State Prison which is located at the Point of the 
Mountain. Also, the attorney for the appellant stated that 
he had no knowledge that the witness called by the State 
would make the disclosure that the appellant had recently 
been in prison. Evidence that the defendant had been in the 
State Prison is equivalent to the evidence that the accused had 
committed other serious crimes. 
In State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P. 2d 491 
(1970), Court said that the law clearly holds that evidence 
of other crimes is not admissable if its sole purpose is to 
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with 
a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed 
the crime charged. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P. 2d 
811 (1970), State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 267, 451 P. 2d 772 (1969). 
In that case, the Court found the error was not prejudicial 
in light of the statements made by the defendant himself on 
cross-examination. 
This Court has consistently held that evidence of 
another crime to be prejudicial. State v. Dickson, 12 
Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961); State v. Kazada, 14 Utah 
2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (1963). 
In State v. Dicksonr supra, the District Attorney on 
cross-examination of the defendant was allowed to question 
him about a charge that he had been an accessory to a robbery 
in Texas. The Court said: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It's only effect was to cast aspersions upon the 
defendant and to imply that because he was involved 
in the Texas trouble he is a person of evil 
character who would be likely to commit such a 
crime as the robbery charged. at 414. 
The Court added: 
Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree of 
assurance that there would not have been a 
different result in the absence of the error 
in cross-examining the defendant about the 
incident in Texas it must be regarded as 
prejudicial and the case remanded for a new 
trial. at 415. 
The evidence that the Appellant had recently been 
an inmate at the Utah State Prison had no probative value 
to any issue in the trial. The only effect this evidence 
could have on the jury was to substantially prejudice 
the right of the Appellant to a fair trial. The admission 
of this evidence is not the type of error which could 
be regarded as a mere irregularity or of such inconsequential 
nature that it could not have been prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the Appellant. State v. Dickson, 
supra, State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P. 2d 388 (1957). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the appellant respectfully 
submits that the conviction and judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
RANDALL T. GAITHER 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
0 5 MAR is?0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
